Turkey - Our 1996 Earthquake Risk Overview
Although Turkey is at risk from a wide variety of natural hazards, including floods, droughts, landslides, avalanches, forest fires, blizzards, and earthquakes, Turks generally equate a natural disaster to earthquake.Turkey is located in an active seismic zone on the Alpine-Himalayan fault line. The zone extends within Turkey for about 1,000 miles from Edremit''s Kaz mountains in the Western Thrace to the Caldiran mountains near Van in the East. Earthquake experience is not new to Turkey since 92% of its population, 90% of its cities, 755 of its industrial complexes, and 40% of its dams are in active earthquake zones (Atac 1995, p. B1). Earthquakes frequently destroy settlements across the country. Fifty-five earthquakes in this century alone have killed over 70,000 people, injured another 122,000, and destroyed 420,000 buildings (Gulkan and Ergunay, 1992).Human interactions with geological, topographical, seismic and climatic characteristics in Turkey have resulted in earthquakes causing about two-thirds of all destroyed human construction units and most of the human and animal casualties. Loss due to construction practices in seismic zones have tended to increase since 1960, increasing the pressure for public and private mitigation action.
Dinar earthquake information comes from interviews with officials of government and emergency response programs.Due to the sensitive nature of accusations against provincial and local officials, interviewing was limited to only those respondents who remained after the earthquake (many had already left before the main shock) and to those officials in the Civil Defense Crises Action Center.This research is based on field interviews of 42 Dinar citizens, 6 provincial and local officials, two professors from the University of Istanbul, and two professors from Izmir.Much of the national public sentiment strongly criticizes mitigation efforts as inefficient and earthquake resistant construction codes as non-enforced.****
Prior to the Main Shock
Residents in the Dinar region had experienced minor to light magnitude earthquakes several days before the main shock occurred. On September 26 a Ms=4.1 was felt in Dinar and its villages. The next day residents felt a moderate Ms=5.1. These two events, combined with the other light tremors, triggered understandable concern, anxiety, and pleas for shelter assistance. According to every respondent, over 90% of the residents feared a larger earthquake and refused to sleep in their homes. People slept in their cars, wagons, trailers, or on the ground. Some of the public buildings had visible damage. The schools were closed, businesses shut down, and residents started evacuating Dinar. Those who remained (estimated at less than 10,000 by Dinar Mayor Ekmeksiz) became very vocal and demanded temporary shelters from the regional stockpile of tents in Afyon. Officials (Assistant Governor) in Afyon tried to reassure the residents that the danger was over on Saturday, September 30. Radio and TV announcements from the Afyon governor attempted to reassure everyone to return to their homes. On Sunday, October 1, on the noon radio news, Governor Yaha Gur announced that the public schools would open on Monday and that everyone should return to their homes. This information was also announced by loudspeakers throughout Dinar. A few residents heeded the official''s advice. Four hours later, a strong earthquake of magnitude Ms=6.1 struck the region. The epicentre was practically under the city of Dinar. Ninety people died and more than 200 were injured. Early estimates were 3,719 houses damaged or destroyed and most of the government buildings destroyed. Damages extended beyond Dinar to 53 surrounding towns and villages. The low loss of life relative to the high damages can be partly attributed to the foreshocks that encouraged people to stay out of their homes. Many, including 75% of the respondents and practically all the national print and visual media, view the loss of life that did occur as excessive, preventable, and attributable to the actions of Afyon''s governor.Casualties and Injuries
A minimum of 90 men, women, and children died in their homes or in public buildings. Over 200 received medical treatment in portable clinics or were taken to surrounding hospitals in Burdur or Afyon. The state hospital was structurally damaged, but the severity had not been determined during the period of this study. The medical personnel were treating victims in the adjacent courtyard.Search and Rescue
Turkey is well experienced with disasters requiring search and rescue actions. Some search and rescue teams and civil defense units were on the scene late on the first day. As with the past five major earthquakes in Turkey, Swiss and German search teams with dogs and detection devices were quickly on the scene by day two. Greece sent a 22-person rescue team and a 6-person medical team to assist. As with previous efforts to quickly rescue survivors during the critical first 48-72 hours, conflicts between use of the sophisticated sound detection devices (which require minimal background noise) and the large, noisy, and heavy equipment operators surfaced. Even so, at least 20 people were rescued by the S&R teams.Structural Damages
Much of the constructive criticism reported in the Erzincan earthquake of March 13, 1992, is also applicable to the Dinar case (EERI, 1993). That is, many structural failures are the result of improper construction not in compliance with earthquake resistant construction codes. Dinar''s public buildings, built by government contractors, were particularly vulnerable and suffered total or major damage. Such was the case for the Security Headquarters building, the Sub-Provincial Governance, the Minister of Justice residence, and the State Hospital. Most of Dinar''s 37 public buildings were destroyed or heavily damaged. Some of these public buildings may have been leased after construction (Citipitioglu, 1995). In these cases the government was not responsible for the construction (nevertheless, such buildings should be thoroughly inspected by civil engineers before leasing).In the 23 neighborhoods of Dinar, 1,228 houses were totally destroyed or heavily damaged, 990 houses were moderately damaged, and 1,558 received minor damages (7). Nine hundred and forty-three houses were totally destroyed in 53 outlying villages under Dinar''s jurisdiction (8). Reports attributed to the national government range from 4,000 destroyed and 1,000 partially damaged in Dinar to approximately 3,000 or 30% of all buildings in Dinar (Ustun, 1995; Bogazici University, 1995).
Buildings in Dinar are one to five stories. The first levels of multi-story buildings on the main streets of Dinar are usually occupied by commercial retail stores. Almost all the five-story apartment buildings were destroyed or heavily damaged. These buildings, as with the buildings on the main streets, were built with reinforced concrete. Walls are either solid or hollow brick. Most buildings suffered heavy damage from severe failure in column and beam-column joints of reinforced concrete. Severe cracks occurred in load bearing walls of masonry buildings. The Post Office (PTT) suffered major damage and was condemned during the period of this study. It appeared to be fairly new.
Assessment and Lessons Learned
The Dinar earthquake was Turkey''s sixth significant earthquake during the past 25 years (1970-1995). On the basis of these experiences the national government has made some improvements in preparing for a disaster. Educating the public by television and print media has been attempted. Correct construction practices to minimize risk, even with low-level technology in poor villages, has been introduced. A formal administrative hierarchy to plan for and manage disasters is in place from the national to sub-provincial level. Research to monitor physical changes and identify areas at risk is ongoing. A national seismic risk map, with modifications, has been available for over two decades. In the area of recovery, the government has extensive experience with rapidly replacing destroyed and damaged homes with safer prefabricated structures. Various universities are conducting research to minimize the risk before the event and to improve the recovery actions and construction practices. Nevertheless, the national public outcry over the Dinar disaster demonstrates that the nation has much more to accomplish in mitigation and public confidence building measures.It appears that the Turkish public has reached a new level of awareness. People seem to now demand that earthquake risk maps be updated, that regulations concerning construction practices to minimize risk be enforced, that quality control be enforced during new construction, and that older buildings and houses clearly at risk be properly retrofitted. This awareness and public opinion are an important step toward more significant progress. But is it realistic to expect major changes in a rapidly developing economy with limited resources and the many domestic challenges discussed above? In some areas, yes.
The purpose of this research is to assess the response to a disaster when a state is in an environment of domestic turmoil. The emergency response of search and rescue appeared to compare favourably with previous earthquake disasters. Politicians, including the President and Prime Minister were quickly on the scene. President Demirel offered condolences and promised to rebuild "the nicest city in Turkey." Unlike previous disasters the government has taken longer to announce definite plans for reconstruction. Parliament representatives attributed local dissatisfactions and damaged government structures to their opponents. The Welfare party (Refah) was particularly critical toward the Ciller government. Less than three months later, the Ciller government was voted out of office and the Welfare party won more seats in parliament than any of the other parties. It is not possible based on this research to determine what impact, if any, that this earthquake disaster had on the subsequent political events. Neither is it possible to state that the political environment caused slower or poorer response. This tentative and cursory research raises many questions and opens the door for a far more extensive work.
Dinar was a warning of what to expect in cities such as Istanbul and Izmir. Enforcing compliance of construction codes for all new public buildings and retrofitting older public buildings is essential. Such action would help build public confidence in the government. This compliance of the law would be important for saving lives and would likely encourage contractors to extend proper construction practices into the private sector. Although Dinar was a warning of what to expect on a much larger scale in Izmir and Istanbul and other large Turkish cities, it also could be a catalyst for critical corrective actions.
Conclusion
Disasters remain a significant problem in all societies. But Turkey is exceptionally vulnerable. A major earthquake in Izmir or Istanbul would be catastrophic. There would be thousands of fatalities and injuries, and economic damage would expand all over Turkey and the region, paralyzing imports and exports and probably costing Turkey about 100 billion dollars in direct and indirect costs (Atac, 1995, p. B1). Clearly, further research is needed to monitor, assess, and provide constructive responses to a problem that will not disappear. Lessons learned from the Dinar case validate a much larger problem whose solution will require political action to re-prioritize and re-allocate very limited national funds.
